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1. Introduction
    Recommendation committees such as Blue Ribbon Committee (1999) and extant 
empirical research (Baxter & Cotter, 2009; Klein, 2002; Abbott, Parker & Peters, 2004) 
indicate that audit committees as an important component of corporate governance 
mechanism, ought to assist the improvement of quality of financial reporting practices 
inclusive of earnings quality. Meanwhile, in the Japanese context, the corporate governance 
reforms movement hat began from 1997 has introduced number of reforms to the traditional 
corporate governance mechanism (Saito, 2009; Hirata, 2004; Gilson & Milhaupt, 2005). 
Further, in 2002, the revised Commercial Code of Japan allowed the adoption of US style 
committee system of which an audit committee is an important committee. Up to date, limited 
number of firms had followed this allowance and had adopted the committee system in the 
Japanese corporate sector. 
    Taking the above factors in to consideration, the contemporary Japanese corporate 
context provides a unique opportunity to evaluate the effectiveness of audit committees over 
the traditional corporate auditor system. Hence, this research uses alternative accruals based 
proxy models to operationalize arnings quality as the basis for evaluation and comparison of 
firms who have adopted audit committees with firms who have not adopted such committees
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for the period 2007 to 2009, and listed in Tokyo Stock Exchange. 
    The contemporary phenomenon of introduction of committee system into the Japanese 
corporate sector and the lack of extant empirical studies in Japan that uses earnings quality as 
a basis of evaluation and comparison is expected to provide a unique contribution and 
distinguishes this research from extant contemporary studies. 
    In terms of findings, it is observed through the multivariate regression analyses that 
there is no statistically significant relation between earnings quality and existence of audit 
committees. Hence, it is not able to conclude that firms having audit committees have superior 
earnings quality than firms that have not adopted audit committee system (i.e. firms with 
traditional corporate auditor system) in terms of accrual proxied quality of earnings, even after 
controlling for alternative explanations. The observed lack of statistical significance leads to 
another inference that objective, resources and expertise of an audit committee as a financial 
monitor may differ from the US context. The emphasis on independence (by mainly deploying 
outside directors in audit committees) seems overshadowing the role of an audit committee as 
afinancial monitor. 
    It should be noted that the findings of this study is expected to have significant policy 
implications over the deployment of appropriate directors to corporate boards in enhancing 
broadly the financial reporting function as well as more specifically the earnings quality of 
firms they serve. 
    The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses the recent 
Japanese corporate governance reforms, extant literature on relation between audit 
committees and quality of earnings and indicates the development of the research hypothesis 
tested under this study. The research methodology that is implemented in testing the 
developed research hypothesis is indicated in Section 3, and Section 4 elaborates the main 
findings of the study with an accompanying discussion. Section 5 introduces additional tests 
for the robustness while Section 6 summarizes the findings and concludes the research study 
at the end.
2. Literature Survey
2.1 Japanese Corporate Governance Reforms 
    Saito (2009); Gilson and Milhaupt (2005); Hirata, (2004), indicate that as a response to 
declining corporate performance, escalation of corporate scandals and less effective traditional
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governance system,, the Japanese corporate governance reforms movement commenced in 
1997. 
   Yoshikawa, Tsui-Auch and McGuire (2007); Saito (2009), further indicate that Sony in 
1997 was the first to introduce the US style board system by introducing outside directors and 
reducing the board size. In line with these reforms, the Commercial Code of Japan was 
amended in 2002, which allowed the adoption of the committee system that is a prominent 
feature in the Anglo-American model of corporate governance (Hirata, 2004; Saito, 2009). This 
allowed establishing audit committees (amongst other committees: nomination committee and 
compensation committee) with outside directors, instead of the traditional auditor system. The 
amended Code required at least three members of such committees of which majority being 
outside directors. 
    Yoshikawa, Tsui-Auch and McGuire (2007), however, indicate that, successful firms as 
Sony and its followers of Anglo-American model of corporate governance, selectively adopted 
features to fit their own situations and did not adopt the US governance system as is. 
    The recent reforms that allow the introduction of audit committees and differences in 
their adoption provide a unique opportunity to investigate their effectiveness over the 
traditional governance mechanism (i.e. traditional corporate auditor system). Hence, this 
study attempts to evaluate empirically the effectiveness of audit committees in a financial 
perspective. Next section elaborates the relation between audit committees and earnings 
quality.
2.2 Audit Committees and Earnings Quality 
    He et al. (2008) indicate that audit committees are generally considered as an important 
component of a firm's overall governance mechanism with particular emphasis on audit 
quality and oversight offinancial reporting. They explain further that audit committees make 
recommendations to the board on the selection of an external auditor, liaison between senior 
financial managers and external auditor on issues such as the financial statements, audit 
process and internal controls, as well as oversee internal auditors, external auditors, and 
management o ensure that they act on the best interest of the shareholders. Moreover, 
recommendation committees uch as Blue Ribbon Committee (1999) and extant research (see 
Baxter & Cotter, 2009) indicate that audit committees assist in improvement of the quality of 
financial reporting practices as well as quality of earnings. 
    As indicated in the introduction, the lack of studies that evaluates the effectiveness of 
audit committees based on earnings quality is specifically noted related to the Japanese
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context. There are few studies investigating the relation between corporate performance and 
the committee system based governance mechanism, however. In one of the extant studies, 
Bebenrotha and Donghaob (2007) find that Japanese firms having committee styled system 
showed strongest performance (performance defined based on Tobin's Q) while traditional 
styled firms (i.e. firms with no outside directors at all in their boards) showed the weakest 
performance. Further, they indicate that firms who had outside directors in their boards (but 
had not adopted the committee styled system) had a mid-level of performance. 
    Extant empirical research related to international context that investigates the relation 
between audit committees and earnings quality is of diverse in nature and provides mixed 
results. In their meta-analysis, Lin and Hwang (2010) provide an insightful empirical 
investigation on the impact of audit committees (amongst other elements of governance 
mechanism) by analyzing several empirical studies published so far. Their conclusions can be 
summarized as follows: the impact of the existence of audit committee on earnings quality has 
mixed results and further research needs to be performed on this dimension; the 
independence of the audit committee members is significantly associated with higher earnings 
quality; higher number of audit committee meetings is positively associated with earnings 
quality; the size of the audit committee has a significant impact on the quality of earnings; the 
financial expertise of the audit committee members has a significant positive impact on the 
earnings quality; and finally, stock ownership of audit committee members also has a 
significantly positive association between the earnings quality. 
    Based on this extant literature, we could reasonably expect a positive relation between 
existence of audit committees and quality of earnings. The next section develops the related 
hypothesis based on this postulate.
2.3 Research Hypothesis 
    The discussion so far on the contemporary Japanese corporate governance reforms, as 
well as the positive relation established in extant empirical research between existence of 
audit committees and earnings quality, poses an interesting empirical research question as: 
whether the existence of audit committees leads to significantly higher quality of earnings of 
firms compared to firms that do not have audit committees (i.e. firms with traditional 
corporate auditor system) in Japan? Based on this research question, following hypothesis is 
formulated and tested under this research: 
    Hl: Firms with audit committees have significantly superior earnings quality compared 
       to firms that do not have audit committees (i.e. firms with traditional auditor
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      system). 
    Section 3 that follows describes the research design and strategy implemented in testing 
the above hypothesis.
3. Research Design
    This section elaborates the details pertaining to the data, selection of the sample, models 
utilized in operationalizing the research question and strategy in testing the research 
hypothesis.
3.1 Data and Sample Selection Strategy 
    NEEDS FinancialQuest database published by Nihon Kezai Shinbun Inc. was primarily 
used to extract consolidated financial data for industrial companies III pertaining to fiscal 
years: 2007 to 2009 (the fiscal year end was considered as any period within this fiscal year 
range). Further, data related to audit committees and directors were secured from NEEDS-
Cges (Nikkei Economic Electronic Databank System - Corporate Governance Evaluation 
System) database published by Nikkei Digital Media Inc. 
    The total number of firm-year observations that had audit committees and were listed in 
Tokyo Stock Exchange for the period 2007 to 2009 were 145 firm-years as per the NEEDS-
Cges database and these firm-years had to be scaled down to 84 firm-year observations due to 
the requirement hat selected firm-year observations should have corresponding information 
that could be used to estimate related earnings quality proxy measures. Moreover, firms that 
had established audit committees during the period of 2007 to 2009 were excluded, as they do 
not have a sufficient period to make an impact over the earnings quality during its short 
period of existence. It is further noted that the majority of the selected sample had established 
their audit committees in 2003. Accordingly, 84 firm-year observations were extracted based 
on firms having audit committees. Further, corresponding to this sample, 84 firm-year 
observations of firms that do not have audit committees (and listed in Tokyo Stock Exchange) 
were selected as the matching sample to represent he traditional auditor based system. As 
per the extant literature (see Lin, Li & Yang, 2006) the matched firms were selected based on 
the similar book value of the average total assets, listed in the same industry sector in and 
corresponding to the same fiscal period. Hence, the total sample consists of 168 firm-year 
observations for the period 2007 to 2009.
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    The next section elaborates the definitions, models, and related measures used for the 
purpose of operationalizing and testing of the research hypotheses indicated in Section 2.3. 
3.2 Definitions, Models and Operationalizations 
3.2.1 Decomposition of Accruals 
    In financial accounting, the relation among earnings, cash flows and accruals can be 
depicted using equation (Eqn. a) as: 
                       Earnings, = Cash Flows, + Accruals, (Eqn. a) 
    In estimating accounting accruals for research purposes, Hribar and Collins (2002) 
indicate that extant empirical research generally has followed two approaches, i.e. an indirect 
balance sheet approach that uses balance sheet amounts for the estimation and a direct cash 
flow statement approach. They indicate that although majority of studies uses the indirect 
balance sheet approach, it suffers from an articulation problem between changes in balance 
sheet working capital accounts and the accrual elements of revenue and expenses of the 
income statement. They empirically provide overwhelming evidence that due to this issue, the 
indirect balance sheet approach introduces estimation errors, and consequently researchers 
may come into incorrect conclusions (especially in the presence non-operating events such as 
mergers and acquisitions, accounting changes or discontinued operations). Therefore, to 
estimate total accruals, this research uses the direct cash flow statement approach as 
indicated in following equation (Eqn. b): 
                     Total Accruals, - Earnings, - Cash Flows, (Eqn. b) 
    Total accruals (denoted herein forth as: TALC, I 'l ) that is estimated using equation 
(Eqn. b) is used as an input of the Modified Jones model elaborated in Section 5.2 to estimate 
discretionary-accruals that is used as an accrual based earnings quality proxy. Net income 
adjusted with extraordinary losses and gains (hereafter denoted as EBEI,) is used as earnings 
as per Hribar and Collins (2002). 
    Further, as a matter of robustness, for estimating an alternative earnings quality 
measure, which is based on the model of Dechow and Dichev (2002), the change in working 
capital (i.e. short-term accruals) are estimated and is used as an input for the model under 
Section 3.2.4. Equation [Eqn. c]) below is used to estimate the required change in working 
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capital (Ebihara et al.,2010).
Change in working capital (herein forth denoted as A WC, "I ) =A Current assets - A Cash 
& deposits -dShort-term investment securities -dShort-term loans receivable -
(ACurrent liabilities -dShort-term loans payable - ACommercial papers -4Current 
portion of the long-term loans payable -4Current portion of the bonds and convertible 
bonds) 
(A is the change in a selected accounting figure from year t-1 to year t.) 
                                                           (Eqn. c)
i 
f
   The model of Dechow and Dichev (2002) is based on how well the change in working 
capital (i.e. short-term accruals) that are estimated based on the balance sheet elements are 
mapping with the past, present and future operating cash flows of the cash flow statement 141 
Any incongruence (i.e. mapping error) is taken as a measure to represent quality of earnings 
under that model (see [Eqn. 1] and explanation in Section 3.2.4).
3.2.2 Defining Earnings Quality 
    Dechow, Ge and Schrand (2010) view quality of earnings as a function of a firm's 
fundamental performance and define earnings quality as; "Higher quality earnings provide 
more information about the features of a firm's financial performance that are relevant to a 
specific decision made by a specific decision-maker" (Dechow et al., 2010, p. 1). 
    After reviewing over 300 empirical studies, they summarize that extant researchers have 
used different earnings quality proxies such as earnings persistence, accounting accruals, 
smoothness, timeliness, loss avoidance, investor responsiveness, as well as internal indicators 
as re-statement and SEC enforcement releases. They, however, indicate that they are not in a 
position to arrive at a single conclusion on what earnings quality is as quality depends on the 
context of the decision-making. Hence, it can be noted that thee proxies used in extant 
literature measure different dimensions of earnings quality and may represents different 
decision contexts I". Next section explains the empirical models that are used to proxy: 
earnings quality.
3.2.3 Alternative Earnings Quality Models and Measures 
    Conventionally, different variants of the Jones (1991) model have been used to 
operationalize arnings quality. However, it has been subjected to criticisms (Dechow, Sloan &
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Sweeney, 1995; Bernard & Skinner, 1996; Larcker & Richardson, 2004). Review of empirical 
literature reveal that the model of Dechow and Dichev (2002) - herein forth referred as the 
D&D model - measures earnings quality in terms of the mapping between short-term 
accruals and cash flows. Further it is noted that variants of the D&D model is gaining 
prominence in recent research as a more valid measure (see Francis et al., 2004; Aboody, 
Francis, Olsson & Schipper, 2005; Dhaliwal, Naiker & Navissi, 2006). 
    Hence, due to these facts and for the purposes of variation and robustness, in this 
research, both the cross-sectional version and the robust (original) time-series version of the 
D&D model is being suggested and used as primary accrual based proxies for earnings 
quality. 
   This dual operationalization of the construct of earnings quality is expected to result in a 
higher robustness of findings and therefore is expected to make the study quite distinct and 
unique. The specific operationalization aspects of these cross-sectional and time-series 
versions of the D&D model are elaborated in the next section.
3.2.4 The D&D model based measures as proxies for Earnings Quality 
    Dechow and Dichev (2002) explains that the residual term obtained by regressing 
equation (Eqn. 1) below, by definition, is the difference between the amount accrued and the 
amount realized. By furthering this argument, they suggest that the standard deviation of the 
residual term as a measure of accruals quality and thereby established a proxy for earnings 
quality. Hence, Dechow and Dichev (2002) introducedthe following model (Eqn. 1) in 
ascertaining estimation errors on a firm-specific basis. -
AWCI= a +/3iCFO1.  +J32CFOt+(33CF0,-1 +E, (Eqn. 1)
i
i
    Where 1'4 AWC, is the change in the working capital (i.e. short-term accruals) from year 
t-1 to year t as indicated in Section 3.2.1. CFO, denotes operating cash flow of the firm for the 
year t. Further, it is noted that the sample period: 2007 to 2009 allows using actual operating 
cash flows from the cash flow statement. 
    As explained in the preceding section, as a point of variation and enhancing the 
robustness of findings, this study utilizes both a cross-sectional version and the original time-
series versions of the D&D model. First, equation (Eqn. 1) above was regressed based on a 
sector specific basis 12J for each period. Then, the coefficients obtained via this procedure was 
fitted in to equation (Eqn. 2) [2i below to obtain the D&D based cross-sectional proxy measure
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(which will be herein forth denoted as AbsD&D,) - which is technically the absolute value of 
the residual term - on a firm specific basis.
AbsD&D, = 3WC,- (a1 +/3,CFOs, +/32CF0,+/3,CF0„1) (Eqn. 2)
    Next, the time-series version of the D&D model denotes the standard deviation of the 
residual term as the earnings quality proxy measure by regressing equation (Eqn. 1) above on 
a moving average basis and the absolute value of the error term is used as the earnings quality 
proxy (denoted as AbsMaD&D, herein forth) for this research. AbsMaD&D, is estimated using 
a 5-year moving average basis that utilizes financial data for the period 2001 to 2010 and the 
standard deviation of residual is estimated for the years: 2007, 2008 and 2009. 
    These two D&D model based earnings quality proxy measures (AbsD&D, and 
AbsMaD&D,) are used alternatively as the dependent variable for the cross-sectional 
regression specification proposed under the next section I'J. Next section introduces the 
analyses suggested under this research.
3.3 Wilcoxon Signed Rank test, Cross-sectional Regression Model and Hypothesis 
Testing 
    In order to compare the earnings quality of firms with audit committees and firms 
without audit committees (i.e. matched based on industry sector and size as explained in 
Section 3.1), the nonparametric Wilcoxon Signed Rank test is proposed and used for this 
study. Zhang, Zhou and Zhou (2007) indicate that Wilcoxon Signed Rank test (that is based on 
the median for the comparison) is the analog of the paired sample t-test 1'J. Under Wilcoxon 
Signed Rank test, the null hypothesis is that firms with audit committees and firms without 
audit committees are not different on a statistically significant basis. 
    Furthermore, a multivariate regression analysis is suggested to control for alternative 
explanations. Regression equation (Eqn. 3) below denotes the multivariate regression model 
specification that is suggested for the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis in 
testing the hypothesis indicated under section 2.3 by pooling the firm-year observations both 
firms with and without audit committees. In this suggested model, the main independent 
variable is the dummy variable: audit committee existence or absence (denoted as AcDum,). 
As explained in the preceding Section 3.2.4, both the cross sectional version and time-series 
version of the D&D measures (i.e. AbsD&D, and AbsMaD&D,) will be used alternatively to 
investigate the expected relation and hence utilized as the alternative dependent variables.
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    In the depicted regression model (Eqn. 3); control variables such as size, earnings, 
leverage etc. of the listed companies are included based on related extant empirical iterature 
(see Lin & Hwang, 2010) that indicates such as significant factors, and depending on the 
relevancy to the context "
AbsD&D, / AbsMaD&D, = a0 + a, AcDum, + a0LnTA, + a.,EBEI, + a4Lever, 
+a,ToBRD, +a0ToOutRto,+e, (Eqn. 3)
    Where "I: AbsD&D, denotes absolute value of the cross-sectional version of the D&D 
model based earnings quality proxy measure for the period t. 'De alternative proxy measure 
AbsMaD&D, denotes the absolute value of the standard deviation of the residual term 
estimated on a 5-year moving average basis for the years: 2007, 2008 and 2009 (see Section 
3.2.4). 
    As explained before, AcDum, denotes the dummy variable representing the existence or 
absence of an audit committee at the year t, in which, "0" represents the firm not having an 
audit committee and "1" represents the firm having an audit committee, at year t. LOA, 
denotes natural ogarithm of the average total assets of the firm for year t "I. EBEI, denotes 
the net income adjusted with extra ordinary items for year t (as discussed in Section 3.2.1) I'J
Lever, denotes the financial everage defined as total liabilities at year t divided by total assets 
at year t. 
    Finally, ToBRD, represents the total number of directors in the board of directors at year 
t, while ToOutRto, denotes the outside director ratio for year t computed as total outside 
directors in the board of directors divided by total directors in the board of directors. 
    It should be noted that AcDum, is the main independent variable under consideration of 
this research. "the next section explains the expected model predictions.
3.4 Empirical Predictions 
    In terms of the model predictions for the multivariate regression specification elaborated 
in the preceding section; since the existence of an audit committee (as against the 
conventional corporate auditor system) variable (AcDum,) is coded as "1" and the absence is 
coded as "0", a negative sign is expected in the coefficient of AcDum, in the pooled regression 
results. This is because that the increase in the dependent earnings quality variable (i.e. either 
AbsD&D, or AbsMaD&D,) characterizes poor earnings quality as increases in those variables 
depict increasing variability of accruals that leads to higher estimations errors and hence,
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poor level of earnings quality. 
    Next section elaborates the findings of this research that utilizes the research strategies 
proposed under this section.
              4. Findings and Discussion 
   This section elaborates in detail of the descriptive statistics and the findings of the 
nonparametric test conducted for comparison a d the pooled multivariate r gression analysis. 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
   Descriptive statistics 1101 are indicated in Exhibit 1 for the both groups of industry and 
size matched samples of firms without audit committees (Panel A) and with audit committees 
(Panel B). 
  Exhibit 1: Descriptive Statistics for the Samples with and without Audit Committees
Panel A
Descriptive statistics for firms without audit committee
n Mean SO 1" Quartile Median 3° Quartile
LnTA, 84 12.0569 1.462E 10.8144 12.2110 13.0973
EBEI, 84 0.0295 0.044E 0.012'_ 0 0325 0.0528
Lever, 84 0.5088 0.2283 0.3630 05420 06796
CFO, 84 0.0573 0.0426 0.029E 00507 0.0822
TACO 84 -0 .0278 0.0533 -0 .0506 -0 .0276 -0 .0008
A WC, 84 -0 .0022 0.0454 -0 .0285 -0 .0020 0 0253
AbsD&D, 84 0.0233 0.0250 0.0044 00179 0.0317
ToBRD, 84 10.3571 3.8547 7,5000 100000 12.0000
ToQutRto, 84 00598 0.1025 0.0000 00000 0.1000
Panel B
Descriptive statistics for firms with audit committee
n Mean SD 1" Quartile Median 3° Quartile
LnTA, 84 12.0649 1 4682 108122 12.2268 13.0829
EBEI, 84 0.0122 0.0734 00055 0.0357 0.0503
Lever, 84 0.5135 02098 0.3695 0.523'. 0.8520
CFO, 84 0.0501 0.0735 00307 0.0669 0.0892
TACC, 84 0.0379 00614 -0 .0640 -0 .0353 -0.0140
A WC, 84 0.0065 00757 -00142 0.0015 0.040'
AbsD&D, 84 0.0328 00437 0.0081 0.0197 0.0383
ToBRD, 84 8.2619 2.329'. 70000 8.0000 10.0000
ToOutRto, 84 0.4858 0.133' 0.3750 0.4286 0.6000
AcOutRto, 83 0.7685 0.1505 06667 0.6667 1.0000
In the above exhibit, Panel A depicts descriptive statistics for firms without audit committees, while Panel B 
indicates statistics for firms with audit committees. The definitions of the variables are stated in Sections 3.2 and 
3.3. n represents firm-year observations per sample.
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    As was explained in Section 3.1, in pursuant of the extant literature, the matching was 
done based on same industry sector 121 and average total assets of the respective firms. Hence, 
the natural ogarithms of the average total assets (LnTA,) isi and the related standard 
deviations (SD) of both groups are thereby approximately the same. Moreover, it could be 
noted that operating cash flows (CFO,) and leverage (Lever,) of the both groups are also 
approximately similar while net income adjusted with extraordinary items (EBEI,) of firms 
without audit committees i observed to be higher than their counterpart group. It is also 
noted that total accruals (TACC) have no major difference between the groups. The change 
in working capital (A WC,) - i.e. short-term accruals - is having a larger difference between the 
two groups of firms, however fill. 
    Importantly, it is also noted that there is a higher outsider director atio in the group 
with audit committees (for both board level: ToOutRto, and audit committees level: AcOutRto,) 
while their average board size is quite smaller in comparison totraditional governance set-ups 
1121 This is seen as natural to expect due to similar provisions and requirements et by the 
Commercial Code (2002) on these dimensions. These characteristics of both groups (i.e. firms 
with and without audit committees) are expected to provide a fair platform for comparison. 
The control variables: industry sector, size of the firms, leverage and operating cash flows are 
approximately the same and the matched samples differ mainly based on earnings quality 
related variables (i.e. earnings and short-term accruals) and the governance variables. 
    Table 1 depicts the correlation matrix (i.e. Pearson's correlation) that explains the 
relations between variables. It is interesting to note that there is a positive relation (as against 
the prediction stated in Section 3.4) between the earnings quality measure: AbsD&D, and the 
audit committee dummy variable: AeDum„ on a univariate basis. It is noted that the relation is 
not statistically significant, however.
Table 1: Correlation Matrix
AbvD&D, AcBum, TACO Iwc LvTA FFFJ CFO, Lever, lbBRD ToOulR1c
Abs080, 
ACDum. 
TACO 
AWC, 
LnTA. 
EBEI, 
CFO. 
Lever, 
ToBRD, 
ToOu(Rto,
1 
0.1322 1 
-0.1089 -0.0878 1 
-0.0357 0,0701 0.6507 " 1 
0.1183 0.0027 0.0249 0.0819 1 
-0.2331 " -0.1419 0.4907 " 0.2919 -- 0.1875 
-0.1335 -0.0607 -0.4578 ^ -0.3258 " 0.1675 
02034 ^ 0.0109 0.1368 0.0446 0.3615 " 
-0.0594 -0.3142 " 0.1097 -0.0303 0.3840 " 
0.1658 ` 0.8745 " -0.0892 0.0647 -0.0566
1 
0.5500 " 1 
0.0271 -0.1035 
0.2037 -- 0.1027 
-0 .2333 " -0.1525 '
1 
0.2446 " 1 
0.0027 -0.3479 "
* * Significant at 1% - Significant it 5%. 
This table depicts the Par. ns conrrelatrn coefficients for th e core vahahlr noticed tinder this stndy.'lhe definitions of the variables are 
stated in Sxtsns 12 and It 3-
i
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    Further, we could observe a statistically significant (p<.01) strong positive relation (i.e. 
0.8745) between existence of an audit committee (AcDum, = "1") and the overall outside 
director atio (ToOutRto,). This relation is observed to be in consequent to the Commercial 
Code (2002) that requires deployment of outside directors as the majority of the audit 
committee (and other committees), but did not require such for boards of traditional board of 
auditors. Therefore, the observed strong positive relationship between these two variables 
could be seen as natural to expect Isl. Furthermore, a statistically significant (p<.Ol) negative 
relation is noted between the size of the board of directors and (ToBRD) and existence of an 
audit committee (AcDum, _ "1") 411 
    Having investigated the descriptive statistics and correlations, the analysis and 
discussion is furthered into the comparison between the two groups of firms, which is 
discussed next-
4.2 Comparison between the Industry and Size matched Groups 
    The comparison between the industry and size matched firm-year observations for firms 
with audit committees and without audit committees is depicted in Table 2, which uses the 
W ilcoxon Signed Rank test as the analytical method for comparison on an annual as well as on 
a pooled basis. The basis of comparison is the earnings quality proxy: AbsD&D,. 
    Based on the p-value (see last column), we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the 
firms are different with statistical significance both on an annual as well as pooled sample 
basis. In other words, the results indicate that firms with audit committees and without audit 
committees are not different on a statistically significant basis. 
    Furthermore, exactly the same conclusions derived under Table 2 are observed for 
annual firm-year comparisons as well as for the total firm-year comparison (results not 
tabulated) for the alternative time-series version of the D&D model based earnings quality 
measure: AbsMaD&D„ which uses 59 industry and size matched firm-years and tested using 
again the Wilcoxon Signed Rank test.
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Table 2: Comparison of firms with and without Audit Committees: Wilcoxon Signed Rank test
n' z-value p-value
Annual Sample Comparison
2007 
2008 
2009
Pooled Sample Comparison
28 
30 
26
84
-12520 
-1.2650 
-0.3940
-1.6810
0.2104 
0.2059 
0 6938
0 0927
This table indicates the 2-values and p-values that are ascertained by comparing firms without and with audit 
committees. The comparison is based on earnings quality measure: AbsD&D,. 
*n represents observations per matched sample.
    It should be cautioned that the Wilcoxon Signed Rank test compares the firms with and 
without audit committees on a univariate basis and results thereon might be influenced by 
other cofounding variables, which may give rise to alternative explanations. This necessitates 
a robust multivariate analysis, which is elaborated in the next section.
4.3 Multivariate Regression Analysis 
    Table 3 reports the results of the multivariate r gression analysis that was proposed in 
Section 3.3. After controlling for several alternative explanations Ixl, it could be observed that 
the expected negative sign (see Section 3.4) between the existence of audit committees 
(AcDum,="1") and both of earnings quality proxies (AbsD&D, and AbsMaD&D), respectively. 
A negative sign was predicted as a decrease of these proxies means lesser estimation errors 
and thereby higher earnings quality.
Table 3: Multivariate Regression Analysis
Dependent Variable AbsD&D, AbsMaD&D,
Coef Std. Error t-value p-value Coef Std Error t-value p-value
ACDurn 
LnTA, 
EBEI, 
Lever, 
ToBRD, 
ToOutRto, 
Constant 
n 
Adj. R-squared 
Model f-value 
Model p-value
-0.0025 
0.0032 
-0.1305 
0.0296 
-0.0008 
0.0182 
-0.0193
0.0110 
0.0021 
0.0456 
0.0131 
0.0009 
0.0231 
0.0227
-0.22 
1.54 
-2.86 
2.26 
0.88 
0.79 
-0.85
0.8240 
0.1260 
0.0050 
0.0250 
0.3820 
0.4310 
0.3960
-0.0141 
0.0004 
-0.1187 
0.0023 
-0.0011 
0.0545 
00291
0.0095 
0.0017 
0.0473 
0.0113 
0.0008 
0.0218 
0.0185
-1 .49 
0.21 
-2 .51 
0.20 
-1 .37 
2.50 
1.20
0.1380 
0.8340 
0.0130 
0.8390 
0 174C 
0.0140 
0.2330
  168 
0.0922 
  3.83 
0.0014
  118 
0.1171 
  3.59 
0.0027
The [able indicates the results for the pooled multivariate regression analysis performed using the suggested 
model under Section 3.3 for the D&D model based alternative earnings quality proxy measures: AbsD&D, and 
AbsMaD&D, as the dependent variable, respectively. The definitions of all the variables are stated in Sections 3.2 
and 3.3.
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    No statistical significance, however, is observed between the existence of an audit 
committees (AcDun:, _ "1") and earnings quality proxies. Therefore, it cannot be established 
that firms having audit committees have superior earnings quality compared to firms that do 
not have audit committees, where the latter group of firms utilizes the traditional corporate 
auditor system for its financial monitoring function. The possible reasons for this finding are 
discussed in the next section.
4.4 Discussion 
    The nonparametric Wilcoxon Signed Rank test indicating that the both groups are not 
significantly different and the multivariate analysis finding a non statistically significance 
relation between earnings quality and existence of an audit committee leads to an important 
discussion, which is elaborated next. 
    Saito (2009) finds that the introduction of outside directors to a firm which has already 
outside directors have a lesser significant impact on a firm's operating performance and value, 
than introducing at least one outside director to a firm that has no outside directors at all. He 
observes that in the latter case, there is a very high significance in the increment of the firm's 
operational performance and value. In the same token, this argument leads to the inference 
that mere introduction of outside directors would have a diminishing marginal impact on 
increasing financial reporting quality and thereby the earnings quality as well. 
    Further, extant research has indicated that outside directors having financial expertise is 
one of the important factors for the effectiveness of auditt committees (Lin & Hwang, 2010; 
DeZoort & Salterio, 2001). In the Japanese context, there is no regulation that requires outside 
directors to have financial qualifications or expertise to be admitted to boards, let alone audit 
committees. Kawamura (2008) indicates that it is extremely difficult in reality to find outside 
directors with suitable business expertise and managerial expertise for Japanese firms. Saito 
(2009) indicates that Federation of Economic Organizations (Keidanren) strongly opposed 
even introducing outside directors under the revised Commercial Code (2002) due to two 
reasons; first being that outside directors were not well suited to executing a useful function in 
the highly relational Japanese corporate affairs and secondly, the difficulty in finding outside 
directors with suitable experience. 
    Hirata (2004) indicates that the audit committee of Sony had all three directors (two 
outside directors and one inside director) with financial expertise in compliance with 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act. He further explains that, however, despite the same committee system is 
being implemented, there are differences of governance systems of firms based on
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management policy and strategy, corporate culture, business environments etc. 
    Furthermore, the results of a survey conducted by the Japan Corporate Auditors 
Association (JCAA, 2004) involving listed and non-listed firms, indicates interesting findings 
on establishing the committee system including audit committees. Out of the 936 listed 
companies who responded, only 1.7% have either implemented or considered to implement he 
committee system. Moreover, out of the firms who had already implemented such committee 
system, only 21.4% indicated that the audit committee could be considered superior to the 
conventional corporate auditor system for monitoring purposes. In addition, their findings 
indicate that out of the firms that did not want to implement the committee system, 41.8% 
believed that conventional auditor system is very suitable for their contexts. 
    When considered the issues discussed in the preceding paragraphs, two mutually 
inclusive issues could be inferred as follows, which are believed to cause lesser statistical 
significance observed in analyses performed in Sections 4.2 and 4.3:
a. The objective of establishing audit committees: 
    The above discussion may indicate that firms who had already established audit 
    committees and other firms trust conventional corporate auditor system rather than 
    audit committees for financial monitoring. Audit committees are mainly deployed with 
    outside directors who primarily address the independence concern as a part of corporate 
    governance mechanism. The main role of an audit committee as a financial monitor 
    seems questionable in contrast to the US context. 
b. Resources and expertise of audit committees: 
    Furthermore, it may be inferred that resources and expertise 113I of audit committees 
    may lack to execute due financial monitoring leading to lower financial monitoring and 
   reporting quality.
I
    Investigating these concerns calls for in-depth case-study nature of research that should 
take into consideration several internal characteristics of audit committees such as resource 
allocation, expertise, authority, reporting structure, and (more importantly) the objective of 
establishing audit committees.
ii
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           5. Robustness and Additional Tests 
    This section elaborates the details and results obtained by additional robust tests 
performed. First the result of the bootstrap rocedure is illustrated, which is followed by a 
discussion of results of an alternative model on earnings quality. 
5.1 Bootstrap Procedure 
    Figure 1 indicates the histogram drawn on the frequencies ofthe cross-sectional version 
of the D&D earnings quality proxy measure: AbsD&D, on the sample not having audit 
committees (which represents the population). Since it is highly skewed, in addition to the 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank test results (indicated in Section 4.2), further testing should be 
considered. 
    Furthermore, as per Exhibit 1, the AbsD&D, measure differs between the two samples in 
terms of standard eviation (SD) as well. This situation warrants abootstrap testing procedure 
(Noreen, 1989) to investigate whether there is a significant difference between firms with 
audit committees and firms without such audit committees ( ee Dichev & Tang, 2009). 
            Figure 1: Histogram on the frequency of AbsD&D, measure
0 
N 
a 
m m C
0
0 
                                0 .05 .1 .15 
                                      AbsD&D, 
The above figure indicates the histogram drawn for the absolute value of the cross-sectional D&D earnings 
quality measure: AbsD&D, for the sample not having audit committees (n=84).
" Mx
    Hence, median value is used for the 
(see Figure 1). The results are indicated in
bootstrap simulation as the mean value 
Table 4.
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Table 4: Results for Bootstrap test
Confidence 
Level
n
Replications Observed 
   Cop(
z-value p-value Normal-based Interval
Lower Upper
@95% 
®99%
84 
84
100c 
1000
0.0179 
0.0179
7.43 
743
0.0000 
0.0000
0.0132 
00117
0.0226 
0.0241
The above table depicts the normal-based lower and upper boundaries derived via the bootstrap simulation 
procedure for the median value at both 95% and 99% confidence intervals. The simulation is based on the sample 
firms with no audit committees (i.e. which represents the population).
    As per Panel Bin Exhibit 1, the median value for AbsD&D, measure for the sample firms 
having audit committees is 0.0197. According to Table 4, based on the results for the normal-
based boundaries for the median value, it is observed that there is no significant difference 
between the two groups of firms (firms with audit committees and without) as the value 0.0197 
falls within the boundaries at both 95% and 99% confidence intervals. This again confirms the 
results and discussion elaborated under Sections 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4.
5.2 Modified Jones model, Wilcoxon Signed Rank test and Multivariate Regression 
Analysis 
    Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995) indicates that the cross-sectional version of the 
modified Jones model (Jones, 1991; Dechow et al., 1995) provides a basis for the estimation of 
discretionary accruals and thereby provides an accrual based proxy measure for earnings 
quality of an entity. Accordingly, as for establishing robustness, discretionary accruals are 
estimated using Modified Jones model that is indicated in (Eqn. 4).
4
TACC, = a,0 +1 3 ~AADJREV, + J32PPEt + e, (Eqn. 4)
    Where "I: TACC, is the total accruals for period t (see Section 3.2 for the definition). 
AADJREV, is the difference in changes in sales and accounts receivable, PPE, is property, 
plant, and equipment, which is measured at net book value at year t. 
    Non-discretionary accruals (denoted as NDAJ,) for the year t is estimated using the 
coefficient parameters that are estimated by regressing (Eqn. 4) above on a cross-sectional 
industry sector 1 a specific basis and then fitting these coefficients to (Eqn. 4) on a firm specific 
basis. DACJ, below is the denotation of discretionary accruals for the year t, which is the 
difference between total accruals: TACC, (see Section 3.2) and non-discretionary accruals: 
NDAJ, and is calculated using equation (Eqn. 5) as follows:
i
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DACJ, = TA CC, - NDAJ, (Eqn. 5)
    The absolute value (as discretionary accruals can be managed either positively or 
negatively) of the estimated discretionary accruals calculated using above equation: (Eqn. 5) 
is used as the earnings quality proxy (i.e. AbsDACJ) for the additional analysis discussed 
next. 
    Table 5 reports the Wilcoxon Signed Rank test results that compare the industry and 
size matched firm-year observations with and without audit committees on an annual as well 
as a pooled basis using the earnings quality measure: AbsDACJ, (i.e. the absolute value of the 
discretionary accruals) as the basis of comparison h14I. Despite the median values of AbsDACJ, 
for the firms without audit committees is higher than firms with audit committees (results not 
tabulated), consistent and confirming the results and conclusions arrived at Section 4.2, it is 
observed that there is no statistically significant difference (see the p-value column of Table 5) 
between firms with and without audit committees. 
    Due to the necessity to control for alternative explanations, however, a more robust 
multivariate regression analysis is performed to confirm the relation between earnings quality 
and the existence of audit committees-
i
i 
r
Table 5: Comparison of firms with and without Audit Committees: Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test
n* z-value p-value
Annual Sample Comparison 
           2007 
           2008 
            2009
30 
30 
29
0.7100 
-1.1000 
-1.2870
0.4779 
0.2712 
0.1982
Pooled Sample Comparison 89 -1.0290 0.3035
This table indicates the z-values and p-values by comparing firms without and with audit committees based on 
earnings quality proxy measure: AbsDACJ. 
*n represents observations per matched sample.
    For the purposes of the regression analysis and testing the hypothesis indicated under 
section 2.3, the absolute value of DACJ (i.e. AbsDACJ,) is used as the dependent variable in 
regression equation (Eqn. 6) that is based on the multivariate regression model specification 
introduced under Section 3.3 and 3.4 (all other independent variables are the same The 
results are indicated in Table 6.
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AbsDACJ, = a, + a,AcDum, + a,LnTA, + a,EBEI, + a4Lever, + a5ToBRD, 
+ a5ToOutRto,+ e, (Eqn. 6)
Table 6: Multivariate Regression Analysis
Coet Std. Error t-value p-value
AcDum, 
LnTA, 
EBEI, 
Lever, 
TOBRD, 
ToOutRto, 
Constant 
n 
Adj R-squared 
Model f-value 
Model lo-value
-0 .0018 
0.0021 
-0 .1557 
0.0518 
0.0003 
0.0181 
-00150
0.0139 
0.0025 
0.0573 
0.0161 
0.0012 
0.0292 
0.0272
-0 .13 
0.83 
-2.72 
3.22 
0.29 
0.62 
-0.55
0.8960 
0.4050 
0.0070 
0.0020 
0.7750 
0.5350 
0.5850
  178 
0.0971 
  4.17 
0.0006
Above table indicates the results for the multivariate regression performed using the proposed model under 
Section 3.3 with the exception of the usage of the alternative arnings quality measures: AbsDACJ, as the 
dependent variable. The definitions of the variables are stated in Sections 3.2, 3.3 and 5.2. 
'the sample firm-years are increased to 178 from 168 (as was indicated in Section 3.1) due to additional firm-years 
having information for the earnings quality measure'. AbsDACf,, under each group.
    Regression results depicted in Table 6 above further confirms the results that had been 
obtained under the multivariate regression analysis performed and reported under Section 4.3 
(see Table 3 for the findings that uses both AbsD&D, and AbsMaD&D, as the earnings quality 
proxy measures alternatively as the dependent variable). It is observed in Table 6, that the 
audit committee dummy variable: AcDum, is having the expected negative sign (see Section 
3.4) with the earnings quality measure: AbsDACJ,. The relation, however, is not statistically 
significant and therefore, it cannot be concluded that firms having audit committees are 
possessing higher earnings quality than the listed companies that do not have audit 
committees, which confirms the findings in Section 4.3. 
    Having confirmed the results obtained under the main analyses by the robustness tests 
discussed under this section, the paper proceeds in summarizing the findings and concluding 
the paper under the next section.
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6. Summary, Conclusion and Future Directions
6.1 Summary and Conclusions 
    This research study empirically evaluated the audit committee system, which was 
introduced as a part of the contemporary reforms of the Japanese corporate governance 
system, using accruals based earnings quality proxies of firms listed in Tokyo Stock Exchange 
for the period 2007 to 2009, over the traditional corporate auditor system. 
    The multivariate r gression results reported in Section 4.3 indicated that there is no 
statistically significant relation between earnings quality (operationalized using both the cross-
sectional nd time-series versions of the Dechow & Dichev (2002] model) and existence of an 
audit committee. Consistent with this finding, the same lack of statistical significance is 
observed under the Modified Jones model (Dechow, Sloan & Sweeney, 1995), which 
operationalizes arnings quality based on discretionary accruals (Section 5.2). The lack of 
statistical significant relations observed in above analyses under both operationalizations is 
corroborating the findings of the univariate Wilcoxon Signed Rank nonparametric analyses 
(Sections 4.2 and 5.2) and the bootstrap testing procedure (Section 5.1), which again indicate 
the lack of significant difference between firms with audit committees, and traditional firms 
who had not adopted audit committees. Accordingly, it is not able to conclude that firms that 
have audit committees have higher quality of earnings compared with their counterparts (i.e. 
firms with the traditional corporate auditor system). 
    As per the discussion under Section 4.4, the observed lesser significance raises 
concerns over objective, resources and expertise of audit committees in functioning as 
financial monitors. The emphasis on independence (i.e. by deploying outside directors) is 
inferred to overshadow the role of an audit committee as a financial monitor in contrast to the 
US context. 
    The findings and conclusion of this study is expected to have significant policy 
implications over the deployment ofappropriate directors to corporate boards in enhancing 
broadly the financial reporting function as well as more specifically the earnings quality of 
firms they serve.
6.2 Limitations and Future Research Directions 
    The current study evaluated the inherently limited sample of listed firms based on 
accrual based earnings quality proxies. Hence, the generalization of the findings and
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conclusions of this study should be (lone with caution. It should be noted that despite the 
research had used well-accepted accrual based proxies to determine the quality of earnings, 
the term earnings quality is itself is a very board construct and extant research has used 
several alternative proxies to operationalize it. Therefore, in terms of future research 
directions, it is suggested to use other bases for the evaluation with a broader sample scope 
that expands beyond listed firms of Tokyo Stock Exchange to non-listed firms as well. 
Furthermore, the causality between audit committees leading to higher quality of earnings 
may be questionable in certain instances, although there is overwhelming conceptual and 
empirical basis and evidence such causality as discussed in Section 2.2. 
    Finally, it is suggested to perform an in-depth case-study nature of research in evaluating 
the objective, resources and expertise (of outside and inside directors) pertaining to audit 
committees, in order to evaluate their function as a financial monitor as there may be other 
important alternative xplanatory variables other than considered under this research.
[Notes]
i'
Complying with the extant empirical research practice, banking corporations, insurance companies and 
other financial institutions are excluded under this research due to significant differences in financial 
statements and being highly regulated industries. 
The Tokyo Stock Exchange classification has 33 industry categories and this research uses the 24 merged 
and adjusted classification (which also excluding financial firms as per endnote 1 above) proposed by 
Kubota, Suda and Takehara (2010) as for maintaining the consistency with the computations of the cross-
sectional versions of the earnings quality measures tated in sections 3.2.4 and 5.2. 
Variables are standardized using the simple average of the total assets at year t and t-I as per the extant 
literature. 
In order to investigate the issue of possible articulation problem raised by Hribar and Collins (2002), an 
analysis was performed to investigate whether the firm-year observation for firms with and without audit 
committees by using the net of the extraordinary items. The absolute values of the net of extraordinary 
items were divided by the absolute value of adjusted net income (i.e. EBEL,). This index was then 
compared between the two sample groups (i.e. firm-year observations of firms with and without audit 
committees) as well as with the same index estimated for the total firm-years of all industrial companies 
listed in Tokyo Stock Exchange (or the period 2007 to 2009. It is observed (results not tabulated) that the 
both groups (i.e. firm-year observations of firms with and without audit committees) are not contaminated 
with extreme net extraordinary items. Therefore, the possible articulation problem is expected to be 
minimal. Further, this minimal effect is confirmed again indirectly by obtaining the almost similar 
regression results reported under Table 6 in section 5.2 by using the balance sheet approach to estimate 
the total accruals (results not tabulated) instead of the income statement approach. 
Since it is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss related concept of earnings quality and related proxies
- 128-
Iu
n
I
no
i,
An Empirical Evaluation of the Effectiveness ofAudit Committees in terms of Earnings Quality
at a length, the interested reader is directed towards the work of Dechow, Ge and Schrand (2010). 
Both the cross-sectional version and the time-series versions are used to control for cross sectional 
variations as well as to capture the true essence of the original D&D model, respectively Further, this 
procedure is expected serves as a robustness check of D&D model itself. 
The paired sample t-test (that uses the difference in means as the basis for the comparison) is not suitable 
to be used in the absence of the assumption of normal distribution of the earnings quality measures 
proposed under this study In Exhibit I of Section 4.1 as well as in Figure 1 of Section 5.1, the mean value 
of the primary earnings quality measure: AbsD&D, suggest he absence of this assumption. 
Under Section 4.1, it is observed that there is a significant positive correlation between existence of an 
audit committee (AcDum, = "I" ) and the overall outside director ratio (ToOutRto,), and these two 
variables have been used as independent variables for the multivariate regression analyses under Section 
4.3 and 5.2. This high correlation necessitates considering the issue of possible multicollinearity between 
these two variables (as well as other variables). Hence, multicollinearity diagnostics were performed 
inclusive of Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) analysis and all VIE factors are well below the acceptable l vel 
of 10, and therefore multicollinearity is not seen as a problem (see Krishnan & Lee, 2009). 
The natural ogarithm of the average total assets is used due to addressing the heteroskedastic effects and 
skewed nature of average total assets data. 
The definitions of the variables depicted are provided in Sections 3.2 and 3.3. 
Using the D&D Model as the proxy for representing earnings quality is further justified by this fact as this 
model estimates earnings quality based on current accruals. 
Saito (2009) indicates that larger board sizes and lesser outside directors in boards of directors in 
traditional governance set-ups. Commercial Code (2002) requires majority of directors to be outside 
directors in the three committees, i.e. in audit committee, compensation committee and nomination 
committee. 
The financial expertise of outside directors have been appreciated using different criteria in extant 
literature related to the Japanese context as directors from the main-bank etc. These measures, however, 
are seen as imprecise and some are now getting less significant (see Miwa & Ramseyer, 2005, for the 
diminishing role of main-banking system as a monitoring mechanism). Due to this fact, lack of other 
suitable precise proxy and smaller sample size of this study, the reliance of inference isexpected to provide 
better insights than using an imprecise proxy for a study of this nature. 
As discussed in endnote 7 above, the justification of usage of this test as the basis of comparison is similar 
to AbsD&D, , the AbsDACJ, used in this section (i.e. Section 5.2) lacks the assumption for normal 
distribution (results not tabulated).
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